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TheMessage Authenticator Algorithm (MAA) is one of the first cryptographic functions for comput-
ing a Message Authentication Code. Between 1987 and 2001, the MAA was adopted in international
standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2) to ensure the authenticity and integrity of banking transac-
tions. In 1990 and 1991, three formal, yet non-executable, specifications of the MAA (in VDM, Z,
and LOTOS) were developed at NPL. Since then, five formal executable specifications of the MAA
(in LOTOS, LNT, and term rewrite systems) have been designed at INRIA Grenoble. This article pro-
vides an overview of the MAA and compares its formal specifications with respect to common-sense
criteria, such as conciseness, readability, and efficiency of code generation.
1 Introduction
To handle real problems, formal methods should be capable of describing the different facets of a sys-
tem: data structures, sequential algorithms, concurrency, real time, probabilistic and stochastic aspects,
hybrid systems, etc. In the present article, we address the two former points. In most case studies, the
data structures and their algorithms are relatively simple, the most complex ones being trees, which are
explored using breadth-first or depth-first traversals, etc. Contrary to such commonplace examples, cryp-
tographic functions exhibit more diverse behaviour, as they rather seek to perform irregular computations
than linear ones.
To explore this dimension, we consider the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA, for short), a
pioneering cryptographic function designed in the mid-80s at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL,
United Kingdom). The MAA was adopted in two international standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2)
and served, between 1987 and 2001, to secure the authenticity and integrity of banking transactions. The
MAA also played a role in the history of formal methods, as the NPL developed, in the early 90s, three
formal specifications of the MAA in VDM, Z, and LOTOS abstract data types.
The present article revives these early efforts by examining, twenty-five years later, how the new
generation of formal methods can cope with the MAA case study. The article is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the MAA from both an historical and technical perspective. Section 3 introduces
the eight formal specifications of the MAA we are aware of. Section 4 discusses some key modelling
issues that arise when specifying the MAA. Section 5 precises how the formal specifications have been
validated and which issues have been uncovered. Section 6 gives concluding remarks. Annexes A and
B report errors found in the MAA test vectors prescribed by ISO standards 8730 and 8731-2. Finally,
Annexes C and D provide two formal specifications of the MAA in LOTOS and LNT, which are novel
contributions.
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2 The Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA)
In data security, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short sequence of bits that is computed
from a given message; the MAC ensures both the authenticity and integrity of the message, i.e., that
the message sender is the stated one and that the message contents have not been altered. A MAC is
more than a mere checksum, as it must be secure enough to defeat attacks; its design usually involves
cryptographic keys shared between the message sender and receiver. One of the first MAC algorithms to
gain widespread acceptance was the MAA, which we now present in more detail.
2.1 History of the MAA
The MAA was designed in 1983 by Donald Watt Davies and David Clayden at NPL, in response to a
request of the UK Bankers Automated Clearing Services [3] [2]. Its authors were formerly involved in
the detailed design and development of Pilot ACE (Automatic Computing Engine), an early computer
based on original designs of Alan Turing. Donald Watt Davies (1924–2000) is a founding father of
computer science, also well known for his pioneering work on computer networks and packet switching
in the mid-60s1. Shortly after its design, the MAA became standardized at the international level in two
complementary ISO banking standards:
• The ISO international standard 8730 (published in 1986 [14] and revised in 1990 [16]) specifies
methods and procedures for protecting messages exchanged between financial institutions. Such
a protection is based on secret keys symmetrically shared between these institutions and on the
computation of a MAC for each message exchanged.
The 1986 version of this standard [14] was independent from any particular algorithm for MAC
computation. Such independence was slightly undermined by the 1990 revision of this standard
[16], which added two annexes D and E providing test vectors (i.e., MAC values for a few sample
messages and given keys) computed using two specific algorithms (DEA and MAA) presented
hereafter. A technical corrigendum was later issued in 1999 [18] to address the Year-2000 problem,
without any impact of the MAC computation itself.
• The ISO international standard 8731 has two distinct parts, each devoted to an approved algorithm
for MAC computation that can be used in the security framework specified by ISO 8730. Both al-
gorithms are mutually exclusive, in the sense that using only one of them is deemed to be sufficient
for authenticating messages:
– Part 1 (i.e., ISO 8731-1) describes the DEA (Data Encryption Algorithm) which is a CBC-
MAC (Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code) based on the DES standard
cryptographic algorithm. The DEA is not addressed in the present article.
– Part 2 (i.e., ISO 8731-2, published in 1987 [15] and slightly revised in 1992 [17]) describes
the MAA itself. An equivalent, freely available specification of the MAA can also be found
in a 1988 NPL technical report written by the designers of the MAA [4].
Later, cryptanalysis of MAA revealed several weaknesses, including feasible brute-force attacks,
existence of collision clusters, and key-recovery techniques [29] [30] [33] [27] [32] [31]. After such
discoveries, MAA ceased to be considered as secure enough and was withdrawn from ISO standards in
2002 [28].
1Biographic information about D. W. Davies can be found from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davies and
http://thelinuxmaniac.users.sourceforge.net/docs/be/chc61.
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2.2 Overview of the MAA
Nowadays, Message Authentication Codes are computed using different families of algorithms based
on either cryptographic hash functions (HMAC), universal hash functions (UMAC), or block ciphers
(CMAC, OMAC, PMAC, etc.). Contrary to these modern approaches, the MAA was designed as a
standalone algorithm that does not rely on any preexisting hash function or cipher.
In this section, we briefly explain the principles of the MAA. More detailed explanations can be
found in [2], [4] and [23, Algorithm 9.68].
The MAA was intended to be implemented in software and to run on 32-bit computers. Hence, its
design intensively relies on 32-bit words (called blocks) and 32-bit machine operations.
The MAA takes as inputs a key and a message. The key has 64 bits and is split into two blocks J and
K. The message is seen as a sequence of blocks. If the number of bytes of the message is not a multiple
of four, extra null bytes are added at the end of the message to complete the last block. The size of the
message should be less than 1,000,000 blocks; otherwise, the MAA result is said to be undefined; we
believe that this restriction, which is not inherent to the algorithm itself, was added in the ISO 8731-2
standard to provide MAA implementations with an upper bound (four megabytes) on the size of memory
buffers used to store messages.
The MAA produces as output a block, which is the MAC value computed from the key and the
message. The fact that this result has only 32 bits proved to be a major weakness enabling cryptographic
attacks; MAC values computed by modern algorithms now have a much larger number of bits. Apart
from the aforementioned restriction on the size of messages, the MAA behaves as a totally-defined
function; its result is deterministic in the sense that, given a key and a message, there is only a single
MAC result, which neither depends on implementation choices nor on hidden inputs, such as nonces or
randomly-generated numbers.
The MAA calculations rely upon conventional 32-bit logical and arithmetic operations, among
which: AND (conjunction), OR (disjunction), XOR (exclusive disjunction), CYC (circular rotation by one bit
to the left), ADD (addition), CAR (carry bit generated by 32-bit addition), MUL (multiplication, sometimes
decomposed into HIGH_MUL and LOW_MUL, which denote the most- and least-significant blocks in the
64-bit product of a 32-bit multiplication). On this basis, more involved operations are defined, among
which MUL1 (result of a 32-bit multiplication modulo 232− 1), MUL2 (result of a 32-bit multiplication
modulo 232−2), MUL2A (faster version of MUL2), FIX1 and FIX2 (two unary functions2 respectively de-
fined as x→ AND(OR(x,A),C) and x→ AND(OR(x,B),D), where A, B, C, and D are four hexadecimal block
constants A = 02040801, B = 00804021, C = BFEF7FDF, and D = 7DFEFBFF). The MAA operates in
three successive phases:
• The prelude takes the two blocks J and K of the key and converts them into six blocks X0, Y0, V0,
W , S, and T . This phase is executed once. After the prelude, J and K are no longer used.
• The main loop successively iterates on each block of the message. This phase maintains three
variables X , Y , and V (initialized to X0, Y0, and V0, respectively), which are modified at each
iteration. The main loop also uses the value ofW , but neither S nor T .
• The coda adds the blocks S and T at the end of the message and performs two more iterations on
these blocks. After the last iteration, the MAA result, noted Z, is XOR(X ,Y ).
In 1987, the ISO 8731-2 standard [15, Sect. 5] introduced an additional feature (called mode of
operation), which concerns messages longer than 256 blocks (i.e., 1024 bytes) and which, seemingly,
2The names FIX1 and FIX2 are borrowed from [24, pages 36 and 77].
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was not present in the early MAA versions designed at NPL. Each message longer than 256 blocks must
be split into segments of 256 blocks each, with the last segment possibly containing less than 256 blocks.
The above MAA algorithm (prelude, main loop, and coda) is applied to the first segment, resulting in a
value noted Z1. This block Z1 is then inserted before the first block of the second segment, leading to a
257-block message to which the MAA algorithm is applied, resulting in a value noted Z2. This is done
repeatedly for all the n segments, the MAA result Zi computed for the i-th segment being inserted before
the first block of the (i+ 1)-th segment. Finally, the MAC for the entire message is the MAA result Zn
computed for the last segment.
2.3 Informal Specifications of the MAA
We consider the 1988 NPL technical report [4] to be the reference document for the MAA definition in
natural language. Indeed, this technical report is freely available from the NPL library or can be down-
loaded from the web, whereas the (withdrawn) ISO standards 8730 and 8731-2 need to be purchased.
The algorithm described in [4] is identical to the MAA definition given in ISO 8731-2.
Moreover, [4] provides the source code of two different implementations of the MAA, in BASIC
(227 lines3) and C (182 lines4). None of these implementations supports the aforementioned “mode of
operation”; we therefore added 31 lines of C code implementing this missing functionality. Although
the C code was written in 1987 for the Turbo C and Zorland compilers, it still compiles and executes
properly today after a few simple corrections, provided that long integers are set to 32 bits5.
2.4 Test Vectors for the MAA
There are two official sources of test vectors for the MAA:
• [4, Sections 15 to 20] provides a series of tests vectors contained in six tables, which can also
be found in [17, Annex A]. These test vectors specify, for a few given keys and messages, the
expected values of intermediate calculations (e.g., MUL1, MUL2, MUL2A, prelude, main loop, etc.)
and the expected MAA results for the entire algorithm. The “mode of operation” is not tested as
the messages considered contain either 2 or 20 blocks, i.e., less than 256 blocks.
• Another series of test vectors that take into account the “mode of operation” can be found in [16,
Annex E]. More precisely, Annex E.3.3 gives expected values for an execution of the prelude,
Annex E.3.4 gives results for an 84-block message, and Annex E.4 gives results for a 588-block
message.
In both series of test vectors, we found mistakes, which we document and for which we give corrections
in Annexes A and B of the present article.
3 Formal Specifications of the MAA
As far as we know, not less than eight formal specifications have been produced for the MAA. We
present each of them in turn, drawing a clear distinction between non-executable and executable speci-
3In the present paper, when counting lines of code, we exclude blank lines, comments, as well as predefined libraries.
Concerning theMAA implementation in BASIC, we also exclude all PRINT statements, mostly intended for debugging purpose.
4We exclude all prinf statements, as well as five non-essential functions (menu1, inmain, mainloop1, fracsec, and
guesstime), only retaining case 5 in the main function, and unfolding multiple instructions present on the same lines.
5For instance, using GCC with options -m32 -std=c90.
H. Garavel & L. Marsso 45
fications. To unambiguously designate these specifications, we adopt the following naming convention:
LANG-XX refers to the formal specification written in language LANG during year XX.
3.1 Non-Executable Formal Specifications
For cryptographic protocols, an informal specification is often not precise enough, and the MAA makes
no exception. For instance, G. I. Parkin and G. O’Neill devoted four pages in [25, Sect. 3] and [26,
Sect. 3] to discuss all possible interpretations of the MAA definition in natural language. The need for
unambiguous specifications was certainly felt by stakeholders, as three formal specifications of the MAA
were developed at NPL in the early 90s, as part of a comparative study in which common examples were
modelled using various formal methods. All these specifications were non-executable, in the sense that
MAA implementations had to be developed manually and could not be automatically derived from the
formal specifications — at least, using the software tools available at that time. Let us briefly review
these specifications:
• VDM-90 : In 1990, G. I. Parkin and G. O’Neill designed a formal specification of the MAA
in VDM [25] [26]. To our knowledge, their work was the first attempt at applying formal meth-
ods to the MAA. This attempt was clearly successful, as the VDM specification became a (non-
authoritative) annex in the 1992 revision of the ISO standard defining the MAA [17, Annex B].
This annex is concise (9 pages, 275 lines) and its style is close to functional programming. Due
to the lack of VDM tools, its correctness could only be checked by human proofreading. Three
implementations in C [25, Annex C], Miranda [25, Annex B], and Modula-2 [21] were written by
hand along the lines of this VDM specification.
• Z-91 : In 1991, M. K. F. Lai formally specified the MAA using the set-theoretic Z notation. Based
upon Knuth’s “literate programming” approach, this work resulted in a 57-page technical report
[20], in which formal fragments (totalling 608 lines of Z code) are inserted in the natural-language
description of the MAA. This formal specification was designed to be as abstract as possible, not
to constrain implementations unduly, and it was lightly verified using a type-checking tool.
• LOTOS-91 : In 1991, Harold B. Munster produced another formal specification of the MAA in
LOTOS presented in a 94-page technical report [24]6. This specification (16 pages, 438 lines) uses
only the data part of LOTOS (namely, abstract data types inspired from the ACT ONE language
[7] [22]), importing the predefined LOTOS libraries for octets, strings, natural numbers in unary,
binary, and decimal notation; the behavioural part of LOTOS, which serves to describe concurrent
processes, is not used at all. This specification is mostly declarative, and not directly executable,
for at least two reasons:
– Many computations are specified using the predefined type Nat that defines natural numbers
in unary notation, i.e., numbers built using the two Peano constructor operations 0 :→ Nat
and succ : Nat→ Nat. On this basis, the usual arithmetic operations (addition, multipli-
cation, etc.) are defined equationally. In practice, such a simple encoding for Nat cannot
feasibly implement the large 32-bit numbers manipulated in MAA calculations.
– The full expressiveness of LOTOS equations is used in an unconstrained manner, making it
necessary at many places to invert non-trivial user-defined functions. For instance, given a
6This report and its LOTOS specification are available on-line from ftp://ftp.inrialpes.fr/pub/vasy/
publications/others/Munster-91-a.pdf and ftp://ftp.inrialpes.fr/pub/vasy/demos/demo_12/LOTOS/maa_
original.lotos, respectively.
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conditional equation of the form x = g(y)⇒ f (x) = y, evaluating f (z) requires to compute
g−1(z). Such situations arise, in a more involved way, with f = NAT and g = NatNum, f =
MUL1 and g= NatNum, f = PAT and g= BitString, f = BYT and g= BitString, f = MAC
and g= Flatten, etc.
Interestingly, such executability issues are not discussed in [24]. Instead, the report stresses the in-
trinsic difficulty of describing partial or incompletely-specified functions in LOTOS, the equational
semantics of which requires functions to be totally defined. Such difficulty is stated to be a major
limitation of LOTOS compared to VDM and Z, although the report claims that LOTOS is clearly
superior to these methods as far as the description of communication protocols is concerned.
3.2 Executable Formal Specifications
As a continuation of the work undertaken at NPL, five formal specifications of the MAA have been
developed at INRIA Grenoble. These specifications are executable, in the sense that all expressions
that contain neither free variables nor infinite recursion can be given to some interpretation engine and
evaluated to produce relevant results. But executable also means that these specifications can be compiled
automatically (e.g., using the translators of the CADP toolbox [10]) into some executable program that
will be run to generate the expected results. Let us review these five specifications:
• LOTOS-92 : In 1992, Hubert Garavel and Philippe Turlier, taking LOTOS-91 as a starting
point, gradually transformed it to obtain an executable specification from which the CÆSAR.ADT
compiler [8] [13] could generate C code automatically. Their goal was to remain as close as
possible to the original LOTOS specification of Harold B. Munster, so as to demonstrate that
limited changes were sufficient to turn a non-executable LOTOS specification into an executable
one. The aforementioned causes of non-executability in LOTOS-91 were addressed by fulfilling
the additional semantic constraints set on LOTOS by the CÆSAR.ADT compiler to make sure that
LOTOS specifications are executable:
– The algebraic equations, which are not oriented in standard LOTOS, were turned into term
rewrite rules, which are oriented from left to right and, thus, more amenable to efficient
translation.
– A distinction was made between constructor and non-constructor operations, and the disci-
pline of “free” constructors required by CÆSAR.ADT [8] was enforced: namely, each rule
defining a non-constructor f must have the form either “ f (p1, ..., pn)→ e” or “c1, ...,cm ⇒
f (p1, ..., pn)→ e”, where each pi is a term containing only constructors and free variables,
and where c1, ..., cm, and e are terms whose variables must be also present in some pi.
– To avoid issues with the unary notation of natural numbers, the Nat sort was implemented
manually as a C type (32-bit unsigned integer). Similarly, a few operations on sort Nat
(integer constants, addition, multiplication, etc.) were also implemented by manually written
C functions — the ability to import externally defined C types and functions, and to combine
them with automatically generated C code being a distinctive feature of the CÆSAR.ADT
compiler. Additionally, all occurrences of the sort BitString used for the binary notation
of natural numbers, octets, and blocks were eliminated from the MAA specification.
This resulted in a 641-line LOTOS specification, together with two C files (63 lines in total) imple-
menting the LOTOS sorts and operations defined externally. The CÆSAR.ADT compiler trans-
lated this LOTOS specification into C code that, combined with a small handwritten main program
(161 lines of C code), could compute the MAC value corresponding to a message and a key.
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• LNT-16 : In February 2016, Wendelin Serwe manually translated LOTOS-92 into LNT [1],
which is the most recent specification language supported by the CADP toolbox and the state-of-
the-art replacement for LOTOS [11]. This translation was done in a systematic way, the goal being
to emphasize common structure and similarities between the LOTOS and LNT specifications. The
resulting 543-line LNT specification thus has the style of algebraic specifications and functional
programs, relying massively on pattern matching and recursive functions. The handwritten C code
imported by the LOTOS specification was reused, almost as is, for the LNT specification.
• REC-17 : Between September 2016 and February 2017, Hubert Garavel and Lina Marsso under-
took the translation of LOTOS-92 into a term rewrite system7. This system was encoded in the
simple language REC proposed in [6, Sect. 3] and [5, Sect. 3.1], which was lightly enhanced to
distinguish between free constructors and non-constructors.
Contrary to higher-level languages such as LOTOS or LNT, REC is a purely theoretical language
that does not allow to import external fragments of code written in a programming language. Thus,
all types (starting by the most basic ones, such as Bit and Bool) and their associated operations
were exhaustively defined “from scratch” in the REC language. To address the aforementioned
problem with natural numbers, two different types were defined: a Nat used for “small” counters,
the values of which do not exceed a few thousands, and a Block type that represents the 32-
bit machine words used for MAA calculations. The Nat was defined in the Peano-style unary
notation, while the Block sort was defined in binary notation (as a tuple sort containing or four
octets, each composed of eight bits). To provide executable definitions for the modular arithmetic
operations on type Block, the REC specification was equipped with 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit adders
and multipliers, somehow inspired from the theory of digital circuits. To check whether the MAA
calculations are correct or not, the REC specification was enriched with 203 test vectors [12,
Annexes B.18 to B.21] originating from diverse sources.
The resulting REC specification has 1575 lines and contains 13 sorts, 18 constructors, 644 non-
constructors, and 684 rewrite rules. It is minimal, in the sense that each sort, constructor, and
non-constructor is actually used (i.e., the specification does not contain “dead” code). As far as
we are aware, it is one of the largest handwritten term rewrite systems publicly available. Parts of
this specification (e.g., the binary adders and multipliers) are certainly reusable for other purposes.
However, it is fair to mention that term rewrite systems are a low-level theoretical model that
does not scale well to large problems, and that it took considerable effort to come up with a REC
specification that is readable and properly structured.
Using a collection of translators8 developed at INRIA Grenoble, the REC specification was au-
tomatically translated into various languages: AProVE (TRS), Clean, Haskell, LNT, LOTOS,
Maude, mCRL2, OCaml, Opal, Rascal, Scala, SML, Stratego/XT, and Tom. Using the inter-
preters, compilers, and checkers available for these languages, it was shown [12, Sect. 5] that
the REC specification terminates, that it is confluent, and that all the 203 tests pass successfully.
Also, the most involved components (namely, the binary adders and multipliers) were validated
separately using more than 30,000 test vectors.
The two remaining formal specifications of the MAA are novel contributions of the present paper:
7Actually, it is a conditional term rewrite system with only six conditional rewrite rules that, if needed, can easily be turned
into non-conditional rewrite rules as explained in [12].
8http://gforge.inria.fr/scm/viewvc.php/rec/2015-CONVECS
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• LOTOS-17 : Between January and February 2017, Hubert Garavel and Lina Marsso performed
a major revision of LOTOS-92 based upon the detailed knowledge of the MAA acquired dur-
ing the development of REC-17 . Their goal was to produce an executable LOTOS specifica-
tion as simple as possible, even if it departed from the original specification LOTOS-91 written
by Harold B. Munster. Many changes were brought: the two sorts AcceptableMessage and
SegmentedMessage were removed, and the Nat sort was replaced almost everywhere by the
Block sort; about seventy operations were removed, while a dozen new operations were added;
the Block constructor evolved by taking four octets rather than thirty-two bytes; the constructors
of sort Message were replaced by standard list constructors; the equations defining various opera-
tions (FIX1, FIX2, BYT, PAT, etc.) were shortened; each message is now processed in a single pass
without first duplicating it to build a list of segments; the Prelude operation is executed only once
per message, rather than once per segment; the detection of messages larger than 1,000,000 blocks
is now written directly in C. These changes led to a 266-line LOTOS specification (see Annex C)
with two companion C files (157 lines in total) implementing the basic operations on blocks9. In-
terestingly, all these files taken together are smaller than the original specification LOTOS-91 ,
demonstrating that executability and conciseness are not necessarily antagonistic notions.
• LNT-17 : Between December 2016 and February 2017, Hubert Garavel and Lina Marsso en-
tirely rewrote LNT-16 in order to obtain a simpler specification. First, the same changes as
for LOTOS-17 were applied to the LNT specification. Also, the sorts Pair, TwoPairs, and
ThreePairs, which had been introduced by Harold B. Munster to describe functions returning
two, four, and six blocks, have been eliminated; this was done by having LNT functions that return
their computed results using “out” or “in out” parameters (i.e., call by result or call by value-
result) rather than tuples of values; the principal functions (e.g., MUL1, MUL2, MUL2A, Prelude,
Coda, MAC, etc.) have been simplified by taking advantage of the imperative style LNT, i.e., mu-
table variables and assignments; many auxiliary functions have been gathered and replaced by a
few larger functions (e.g., PreludeJ, PreludeK, PreludeHJ, and PreludeHK) also written in the
imperative style. These changes resulted in a 268-line LNT specification with a 136-line compan-
ion C file, which have nearly the same size as LOTOS-17 , although the LNT version is more
readable and closer to the original MAA specification [4], also expressed in the imperative style.
Taken alone, the LNT code has approximately the same size as VDM-90 , the non-executable
specification that was included as a formal annex in the MAA standard [17].
As for REC-17 , the LNT specification was then enriched with a collection of “assert” statements
implementing: (i) the test vectors listed in Tables 1 to 6 of [17, Annex A] and [4]; (ii) the test
vectors of [16, Annex E.3.3]; (iii) supplementary test vectors intended to specifically check for
certain aspects (byte permutations and message segmentation) that were not enough covered by
the above tests; this was done by introducing a makeMessage function acting as a pseudo-random
message generator.
Consequently, the size of the LNT files grew up to 1334 lines in total (see Annex D)10. Finally,
the remaining test vectors of [16, Annexes E.3.4 and E.4], which were too lengthy to be included
in REC-17 , have been stored in text files and can be checked by running the C code generated
from the LNT specification. This makes of LNT-17 the most complete formal specification of
the MAA as far as validation is concerned.
9The most recent version of these files is available from ftp://ftp.inrialpes.fr/pub/vasy/demos/demo_12/LOTOS.
10The most recent version of these files is available from ftp://ftp.inrialpes.fr/pub/vasy/demos/demo_12.
H. Garavel & L. Marsso 49
4 Modelling issues
In this section, we investigate some salient issues faced when modelling the MAA using diverse formal
methods. We believe that such issues are not specific to the MAA, but are likely to arise whenever
non-trivial data structures and algorithms are to be described formally.
4.1 Local variables in function definitions
Local variables are essential to store computed results that need to be used several times, thus avoid-
ing identical calculations to be repeated. LNT allows to freely define and assign local variables in an
imperative-programming style; the existence of a formal semantics is guaranteed by static semantic con-
straints [9] ensuring that each variable is duly assigned before used. For instance, the MUL1 function11 is
expressed in LNT as follows:
function MUL1 (X, Y : Block) : Block is
var U, L, S, C : Block in
U := HIGH_MUL (X, Y);
L := LOW_MUL (X, Y);
S := ADD (U, L);
C := CAR (U, L);
assert (C == x00000000) or (C == x00000001);
return ADD (S, C)
end var
end function
In VDM, which enjoys a “let” operator, the definition of MUL1 is very similar to the LNT one [25,
page 11] [26, Sect. 2.2.5]. The situation is quite different for term rewrite systems and abstract data
types, which lack a “let” operator in their rewrite rules or equations. Interestingly, LOTOS-91 tries to
emulate such a “let” operator by (ab)using the premises of conditional equations [24, pages 37 and 78]:
opns MUL1 : Block, Block -> Block
forall X, Y, U, L, S, P: Block, C: Bit
NatNum (X) * NatNum (Y) = NatNum (U ++ L),
NatNum (U) + NatNum (L) = NatNum (S) + NatNum (C),
NatNum (C + S) = NatNum (P)
=> MUL1 (X, Y) = P;
These premises define and compute12 the variables (U, L), (S, C), and P, respectively. Unfortunately,
most languages and tools for term rewriting forbid such free variables in premises, requiring that only the
parameters of the function under definition (here, X and Y for the MUL1 function) can occur in premises.
Instead, LOTOS-17 and REC-17 adopt a more conventional style in which auxiliary operations
are introduced, the parameters of which are used to store computed results that need to be used more
than once:
opns MUL1 : Block, Block -> Block
MUL1_UL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL1_SC : Block, Block -> Block
forall X, Y, U, L, S, C : Block
11The same discussion is also valid for MUL2, MUL2A, and many other MAA functions.
12These premises silently require the computation of inverse functions for NumNat, +, and ++ (bit string concatenation).
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MUL1 (X, Y) = MUL1_UL (HIGH_MUL (X, Y), LOW_MUL (X, Y));
MUL1_UL (U, L) = MUL1_SC (ADD (U, L), CAR (U, L));
MUL1_SC (S, C) = ADD (S, C);
In comparison, the imperative-programming style of LNT is clearly more concise, more readable, and
closer to the original description of MUL1. Moreover, LNT permits successive assignments to the same
variable, which proved to be useful in, e.g., the MainLoop and MAC functions.
4.2 Functions returning multiple results
Another point in which the various MAA specifications differ is the handling of functions that compute
more than one result. There are several such functions in the MAA; let us consider the Prelude function,
which takes two block parameters J and K and returns six block parameters X, Y, V, W, S, and T.
The simplest description of this function is achieved in LNT-17 , which exploits the fact that LNT
functions, like in imperative programming languages, may return a result and/or have “out” parameters.
In LNT, the Prelude function can be defined this way:
function Prelude (in J, K : Block, out X, Y, V, W, S, T : Block) is
...
end function
and invoked as follows:
Prelude (J, K, ?X0, ?Y0, ?V0, ?W, ?S, ?T)
Although this approach is the simplest one, most formal methods do not support procedures or functions
with “out” parameters13. In such languages where functions return only a single result, there are two
different options for describing functions with multiple results such as Prelude.
The first option is return a unique result of some compound type (record, tuple, array, etc.). For
instance, both VDM-90 and Z-91 describe Prelude as a function taking a pair of blocks and returning
a result of a new type (called Key-Constant [25, Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.7] orDerivedSpace [20, pages 45–
46]) defined as a sextuple of blocks. LOTOS-91 and LOTOS-17 adopt a similar approach by defining
Prelude to return a result of a new sort ThreePairs, which is a triple of Pair values, where sort Pair
is itself defined as a pair of blocks. Other examples can be found in the binary adders and multipliers of
REC-17 ; for instance, the 8-bit adder returns a result of sort OctetSum that is a pair gathering a sum
(of sort Octet) and a carry (of sort Sum).
The drawbacks of this first option are numerous: (i) new types have to be introduced — potentially
one type per defined function in the worst case; (ii) each of these types introduces in turn a constructor
and, often, equality and projection functions as well; (iii) the specification gets obscured by tupling/de-
tupling operations, with the aggravating circumstance that detupling can be performed in different ways
(pattern matching, destructuring “let”, or projection functions), which makes it difficult to follow the flow
of a particular variable embedded in a tuple of values; (iv) tupling complicates the efforts of compilers
and garbage collector to allocate memory efficiently.
The second option is to split a function returning N > 1 results into N separate functions. For in-
stance, REC-17 has split Prelude into three operations: preludeXY, which computes the pair (X0,Y0),
preludeVW, which computes the pair (V0,W), and preludeST, which computes the pair (S,T). This
transformation applied to Prelude and to the main-loop functions enabled the sorts TwoPairs and
ThreePairs introduced in LOTOS-91 to be entirely removed from REC-17 .
13Besides LNT, the only other language we know to offer “out” parameters is the synchronous dataflow language Lustre.
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The drawbacks of this second option are two-fold: (i) splitting a function with multiple results might
be difficult if the calculations for these results are tightly intertwined; this was not the case with the six
Prelude results, each of which does not depend on the five other ones14; (ii) splitting may require to
duplicate identical calculations, and thus create inefficiencies that in turn may require the introduction of
auxiliary functions to be avoided.
5 Validation of MAA Specifications
The two most recent specifications of the MAA have been validated as follows:
• LOTOS-17 : The specification was validated by the CÆSAR.ADT compiler, which implements
all the syntactic and semantic checks stated in the definition of LOTOS [19]. The C code generated
from the LOTOS specification passed the test vectors specified in [16, Annexes E.3.4 and E.4].
• LNT-17 : The specification was validated by the LNT2LOTOS translator, which implements the
syntactic checks and (part of) the semantic checks stated in the definition of LNT [1] and generates
LOTOS code, which is then validated by the CÆSAR.ADT compiler, therefore performing the
remaining semantics checks of LNT. The C code generated by the CÆSAR.ADT compiler passed
the test vectors specified in [17, Annex A], in [16, Annexes E.3], in [16, Annexes E.3.4 and E.4],
and the supplementary test vectors based on the MakeMessage function.
Due to these checks, various mistakes were discovered in prior (informal and formal) specifications
of the MAA: (i) Annex A corrects the test vectors given in [16, Annex E]; (ii) Annex B corrects the test
vectors given for function PAT in [17, Annex A] and [4]; (iii) an error was found in the main C program,
which computed an incorrect MAC value, as the list of blocks storing the message was built in reverse
order; (iv) another error was found in the external implementation in C of the function HIGH_MUL, which
computes the highest 32 bits of the 64-bit product of two blocks and is imported by the LOTOS and LNT
specifications — this illustrates the risks arising when formal and non-formal codes are mixed.
6 Conclusion
Twenty-five years after, we revisited the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), which used to be a
pioneering case study for cryptography in the 80s and for formal methods in the early 90s. The three
MAA specifications VDM-90 , Z-91 , and LOTOS-91 developed at NPL in 1990–1991 were clearly
leading-edge, as can be seen from the adoption of the VDM specification as part of the ISO international
standard 8731-2 in 1992. However, they also faced limitations: these were mostly pen-and-pencil for-
mal methods that lacked automated validation tools and that required implementations to be developed
manually, thus raising the difficult question of the compatibility between the formal specification and the
handwritten implementation code.
A different path has been followed at INRIA Grenoble since the early 90s, with an emphasis on exe-
cutable formal methods, from which implementations can be generated automatically. Five specifications
have been successively developed: LOTOS-92 , LNT-16 , REC-17 , LOTOS-17 , and LNT-17 .
Retrospectively, heading towards executable formal methods proved to be a successful bet:
14This was pointed out as a cryptographic weakness of the MAA in [33, Sect. 6].
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• It turns out that executable specifications are not necessarily longer than non-executable ones:
LNT-17 and LOTOS-17 (345 and 423 lines, respectively, including the external C code frag-
ments) are half way between the non-executable specifications VDM-90 (275 lines) and Z-91
(608 lines). Also, LNT-17 is only 60% larger than the direct implementation in C given in [4].
• One might argue that the LOTOS and LNT specifications are not entirely formal, as they import a
few C types and functions to implement blocks and arithmetic operations on blocks. We see this
as a strength, rather than a weakness, of our approach. Moreover, nothing prevents such external
types and functions to be instead defined in LOTOS or in LNT, as this was the case with the
REC-17 specification, which was then automatically translated to self-contained, fully-formal
LOTOS and LNT specifications that were successfully compiled and executed.
• The insight gained by comparing the eight formal specifications of the MAA confirms that LNT
is a formal method of choice for modelling complex algorithms and data structures. Compared
to other formalisms, LNT offers an imperative specification style (based on mutable variables and
assignments) that proved to be simpler to write, easier to read, more concise, and closer to the
MAA description in natural language [4], from which specifications based on term rewrite sys-
tems and abstract data types significantly depart due to picky technical restrictions in these latter
formalisms. LNT also favors a more disciplined specification style that, we believe, is of higher
quality because of the numerous static-analysis checks (e.g., unused variables, useless assign-
ments, etc.) performed by the LNT2LOTOS translator; such strict controls are, to the best of our
knowledge, absent from most other specification languages.
• The application of executable formal methods to the MAA case study was fruitful in several re-
spects: (i) it detected errors in the reference test vectors given in ISO standards 8730 and 8731-2;
(ii) the LOTOS specification of the MAA, due to its size and complexity, was helpful in improving
early versions of the CÆSAR.ADT compiler; (iii) similarly, the LNT specification of the MAA
revealed in the LNT2LOTOS translator a few defects and performance issues, which have been
dealt with in 2016 and 2017.
• Moreover, executable formal methods benefit from significant progress in their compiling tech-
niques. In 1990, a handwritten implementation of the MAA in Miranda took 60 seconds to process
an 84-block message and 480 seconds to process a 588-block message [25, page 37]. Today, the
implementations automatically generated from the LNT and LOTOS specifications of the MAA
take 0.65 and 0.37 second, respectively, to process a one-million-block message15. As it appears,
“formal” and “executable” are no longer mutually exclusive qualities.
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A Errata Concerning Annex E of the ISO-8730:1990 Standard
After reading and checking carefully the test vectors given in [16, Annex E], we discovered a number of
errors17. Here is the list of errors found and their corrections:
• In Annex E.2, some characters of the text message differ from the corresponding ASCII code
given (in hexadecimal) below in Annex E.3.2. Precisely, the string "BE CAREFUL" should read
"BE\n\n\ \ \ Careful", where "\n" and "\ " respectively denote line-feed and white space.
The corresponding hexadecimal values are indeed 42 45 0A 0A 20 20 20 43 61 72 65 66 75 6C.
• Annex E.3.2 and Annex E.3.4 state that this text message has 86 blocks. Actually, it has 84 blocks
only. This is confirmed by the table of hexadecimal values in Annex E.3.2 (42 lines × 2 blocks per
line give 84 blocks) and by the iterations listed in Annex E.3.4, in which the number of message
blocks (i.e., variable N) ranges between 1 and 84.
• Annex E.4 states that the long message is obtained by repeating six times the message of 86 blocks,
leading to a message length of 516 blocks. Actually, it is obtained by repeating seven times the
message of 84 blocks, leading to a message length of 588 blocks. This can be seen from the
iterations listed in Annex E.4 where variable N ranges between 1 and 588, and by the fact that
588= 7×84. Moreover, computing the MAA result on the 588-block long message with the same
key J = E6 A1 2F 07 and K = 9D 15 C4 37 as in Annex E.3.3 indeed gives the expected MAC
value C6 E3 D0 00.
B Errata Concerning Annex A of the ISO-8731-2:1992 Standard
After checking carefully all the test vectors contained in the original NPL report defining the MAA [4]
and in the 1992 version of the MAA standard [17], we believe that there are mistakes18 in the test vectors
given for function PAT.
More precisely, the three last lines of Table 3 [4, page 15] — identically reproduced in Table A.3 of
[17, Sect. A.4] — are written as follows:
{X0,Y0} 0103 0703 1D3B 7760 PAT{X0,Y0} EE
{V0,W} 0103 050B 1706 5DBB PAT{V0,W} BB
{S,T} 0103 0705 8039 7302 PAT{S,T} E6
17We used the French version of that standard, which we acquired from AFNOR, but have no reason to believe that the same
errors are absent from other translations of this standard.
18Again, we used the French version of this standard, but we believe that this plays no role, as the same mistakes were already
present in the 1988 NPL report.
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Actually, the inputs of function PAT should not be {X0,Y0}, {V0,W}, {S,T} but rather {H4,H5},
{H6,H7}, {H8,H9}, the values of H4, ..., H9 being those listed above in Table 3. Notice that the confusion
was probably caused by the following algebraic identities:
{X0,Y0} = BYT (H4, H5)
{V0,W} = BYT (H6, H7)
{S,T} = BYT (H8, H9)
If one gives {X0,Y0}, {V0,W}, {S,T} as inputs to PAT, then the three results of PAT are equal to 00
and thus cannot be equal to EE, BB, E6, respectively.
But if one gives {H4,H5}, {H6,H7}, {H8,H9} as inputs to PAT, then the results of PAT are the
expected values EE, BB, E6.
Thus, we believe that the three last lines of Table 3 should be modified as follows:
{H4,H5} 0000 0003 0000 0060 PAT{H4,H5} EE
{H6,H7} 0003 0000 0006 0000 PAT{H6,H7} BB
{H8,H9} 0000 0005 8000 0002 PAT{H8,H9} E6
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C Formal Specification of the MAA in LOTOS
This annex presents the specification LOTOS-17 of the MAA in LOTOS. This specification uses several
predefined libraries of LOTOS, namely: the libraries for Booleans and natural numbers, which we do
not reproduce here, and the libraries for bits, octets, and octet values, of which we only display excerpts
needed for understanding the MAA specification.
C.1 The BIT library
This predefined LOTOS library defines the Bit type with its related operations. Only a simplified version
of this library is presented here.
type Bit is Boolean, NaturalNumber
sorts
Bit
opns
0 (∗! constructor ∗), 1 (∗! constructor ∗) : -> Bit
not : Bit -> Bit
_and_, _or_, _xor_ : Bit, Bit -> Bit
_eq_, _ne_ : Bit, Bit -> Bool
eqns
forall x,y : Bit
ofsort Bit
not (0) = 1;
not (1) = 0;
x and 0 = 0;
x and 1 = x;
x or 0 = x;
x or 1 = 1;
x xor 0 = x;
x xor 1 = not (x);
ofsort Bool
x eq x = true;
0 eq 1 = false;
1 eq 0 = false;
x ne y = x eq y;
endtype
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C.2 The OCTET library
This predefined LOTOS library defines the Octet type (i.e., an 8-bit word) with its related operations.
Only an excerpt of this library is presented here.
type Octet is Bit, Boolean
sorts
Octet
opns
Octet (∗! constructor ∗) : Bit, Bit, Bit, Bit, Bit, Bit, Bit, Bit -> Octet
Bit1, Bit2, Bit3, Bit4, Bit5, Bit6, Bit7, Bit8 : Octet -> Bit
not : Octet -> Octet
_and_, _or_, _xor_ : Octet, Octet -> Octet
_eq_, _ne_ : Octet, Octet -> Bool
eqns
ofsort Bit
forall b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8 : Bit
Bit1 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b1;
Bit2 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b2;
Bit3 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b3;
Bit4 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b4;
Bit5 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b5;
Bit6 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b6
Bit7 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b7;
Bit8 (Octet (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8)) = b8;
ofsort Octet
forall x, y : Octet
not (x) = Octet (not (Bit1 (x)), not (Bit2 (x)),
not (Bit3 (x)), not (Bit4 (x)),
not (Bit5 (x)), not (Bit6 (x)),
not (Bit7 (x)), not (Bit8 (x)));
x and y = Octet (Bit1 (x) and Bit1 (y), Bit2 (x) and Bit2 (y),
Bit3 (x) and Bit3 (y), Bit4 (x) and Bit4 (y),
Bit5 (x) and Bit5 (y), Bit6 (x) and Bit6 (y),
Bit7 (x) and Bit7 (y), Bit8 (x) and Bit8 (y));
x or y = Octet (Bit1 (x) or Bit1 (y), Bit2 (x) or Bit2 (y),
Bit3 (x) or Bit3 (y), Bit4 (x) or Bit4 (y),
Bit5 (x) or Bit5 (y), Bit6 (x) or Bit6 (y),
Bit7 (x) or Bit7 (y), Bit8 (x) or Bit8 (y));
x xor y = Octet (Bit1 (x) xor Bit1 (y), Bit2 (x) xor Bit2 (y),
Bit3 (x) xor Bit3 (y), Bit4 (x) xor Bit4 (y),
Bit5 (x) xor Bit5 (y), Bit6 (x) xor Bit6 (y),
Bit7 (x) xor Bit7 (y), Bit8 (x) xor Bit8 (y));
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ofsort Bool
forall x, y : Octet
x eq y = (Bit1 (x) eq Bit1 (y)) and (Bit2 (x) eq Bit2 (y)) and
(Bit3 (x) eq Bit3 (y)) and (Bit4 (x) eq Bit4 (y)) and
(Bit5 (x) eq Bit5 (y)) and (Bit6 (x) eq Bit6 (y)) and
(Bit7 (x) eq Bit7 (y)) and (Bit8 (x) eq Bit8 (y));
x ne y = not (x eq y);
endtype
C.3 The OCTETVALUES library
This predefined LOTOS library defines 256 constant functions x00, ..., xFF that provide shorthand nota-
tions for octet values. Only an excerpt of this library is presented here.
type OctetValues is Bit, Octet
opns
x00, x01, ... xFE, xFF : -> Octet
eqns
ofsort Octet
x00 = Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
x01 = Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
...
xFE = Octet (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0);
xFF = Octet (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1);
endtype
C.4 The MAA specification
specification MAA: noexit
library
X_NATURAL, BIT, BOOLEAN, OCTET, OCTETVALUES
endlib
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type Block is Boolean, Bit, Octet
sorts
Block (∗! implementedby BLOCK printedby PRINT BLOCK ∗)
opns
Block (∗! implementedby BUILD BLOCK constructor ∗) :
Octet, Octet, Octet, Octet -> Block
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_eq_ (∗! implementedby EQUAL BLOCK ∗) : Block, Block -> Bool
AND : Block, Block -> Block
OR : Block, Block -> Block
XOR : Block, Block -> Block
CYC : Block -> Block
ADD (∗! implementedby ADD external ∗) : Block, Block -> Block
CAR (∗! implementedby CAR external ∗) : Block, Block -> Block
HIGH_MUL (∗! implementedby HIGH MUL external ∗) : Block, Block -> Block
LOW_MUL (∗! implementedby LOW MUL external ∗) : Block, Block -> Block
eqns
ofsort Bool
forall X, Y : Block
X eq X = true;
X eq Y = false; (∗ assuming priority between equations ∗)
ofsort Block
forall O1, O2, O3, O4, P1, P2, P3, P4 : Octet
AND (Block (O1, O2, O3, O4), Block (P1, P2, P3, P4)) =
Block (O1 and P1, O2 and P2, O3 and P3, O4 and P4);
OR (Block (O1, O2, O3, O4), Block (P1, P2, P3, P4)) =
Block (O1 or P1, O2 or P2, O3 or P3, O4 or P4);
XOR (Block (O1, O2, O3, O4), Block (P1, P2, P3, P4)) =
Block (O1 xor P1, O2 xor P2, O3 xor P3, O4 xor P4);
ofsort Block
forall B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8,
B9, B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16,
B17, B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B23, B24,
B25, B26, B27, B28, B29, B30, B31, B32 : Bit
CYC (Block (Octet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
Octet (B9, B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16),
Octet (B17, B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B23, B24),
Octet (B25, B26, B27, B28, B29, B30, B31, B32))) =
Block (Octet (B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9),
Octet (B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16, B17),
Octet (B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B23, B24, B25),
Octet (B26, B27, B28, B29, B30, B31, B32, B1));
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type Pairs is Block
sorts
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Pair,
TwoPairs,
ThreePairs
opns
Pair (∗! constructor ∗) : Block, Block -> Pair
TwoPairs (∗! constructor ∗) : Pair, Pair -> TwoPairs
ThreePairs (∗! constructor ∗) : Pair, Pair, Pair -> ThreePairs
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type Message is Block, Natural
sorts
Message (∗! implementedby MESSAGE ∗)
opns
nil (∗! implementedby NIL MESSAGE constructor ∗) : -> Message
_++_ (∗! implementedby PLUS MESSAGE constructor ∗) :
Block, Message -> Message
Reverse (∗! implementedby REVERSE external ∗) : Message -> Message
(∗ Reverse is not invoked in ”maa.lotos” but in ”main.c” ∗)
(∗ for efficiency reason, Reverse is implemented directly in C ∗)
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type Functions is Block, OctetValues, Pairs
opns
A_CONSTANT : -> Block
B_CONSTANT : -> Block
C_CONSTANT : -> Block
D_CONSTANT : -> Block
FIX1 : Block -> Block
FIX2 : Block -> Block
MUL1 : Block, Block -> Block
MUL1_UL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL1_SC : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2 : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2_UL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2_DEL : Block, Block, Block -> Block
MUL2_FL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2_SC : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2A : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2A_UL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2A_DL : Block, Block -> Block
MUL2A_SC : Block, Block -> Block
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NeedAdjust : Octet -> Bool
AdjustCode : Octet -> Bit
Adjust : Octet, Octet -> Octet
PAT : Block, Block -> Octet
BYT : Block, Block -> Pair
AuxBYT : Block, Block, Octet -> Pair
eqns
ofsort Block
A_CONSTANT = Block (x02, x04, x08, x01);
B_CONSTANT = Block (x00, x80, x40, x21);
C_CONSTANT = Block (xBF, xEF, x7F, xDF);
D_CONSTANT = Block (x7D, xFE, xFB, xFF);
ofsort Block
forall X : Block
FIX1 (X) = AND (OR (X, A_CONSTANT), C_CONSTANT);
FIX2 (X) = AND (OR (X, B_CONSTANT), D_CONSTANT);
ofsort Block
forall X, Y, U, L, S, C : Block
MUL1 (X, Y) = MUL1_UL (HIGH_MUL (X, Y), LOW_MUL (X, Y));
MUL1_UL (U, L) = MUL1_SC (ADD (U, L), CAR (U, L));
MUL1_SC (S, C) = ADD (S, C);
ofsort Block
forall X, Y, U, L, D, F, E, S, C : Block
MUL2 (X, Y) = MUL2_UL (HIGH_MUL (X, Y), LOW_MUL (X, Y));
MUL2_UL (U, L) = MUL2_DEL (ADD (U, U), CAR (U, U), L);
MUL2_DEL (D, E, L) = MUL2_FL (ADD (D, ADD (E, E)), L);
MUL2_FL (F, L) = MUL2_SC (ADD (F, L), CAR (F, L));
MUL2_SC (S, C) = ADD (S, ADD (C, C));
ofsort Block
forall X, Y, U, L, D, S, C : Block
MUL2A (X, Y) = MUL2A_UL (HIGH_MUL (X, Y), LOW_MUL (X, Y));
MUL2A_UL (U, L) = MUL2A_DL (ADD (U, U), L);
MUL2A_DL (D, L) = MUL2A_SC (ADD (D, L), CAR (D, L));
MUL2A_SC (S, C) = ADD (S, ADD (C, C));
ofsort Bool
forall O: Octet
NeedAdjust (O) = (O eq x00) or (O eq xFF);
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ofsort Bit
forall O: Octet
NeedAdjust (O) => AdjustCode (O) = 1;
not (NeedAdjust (O)) => AdjustCode (O) = 0;
ofsort Octet
forall O, P: Octet
NeedAdjust (O) => Adjust (O, P) = O xor P;
not (NeedAdjust (O)) => Adjust (O, P) = O;
ofsort Octet
forall X, Y: Block, O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8: Octet
PAT (Block (O1, O2, O3, O4), Block (O5, O6, O7, O8)) =
Octet (AdjustCode (O1), AdjustCode (O2),
AdjustCode (O3), AdjustCode (O4),
AdjustCode (O5), AdjustCode (O6),
AdjustCode (O7), AdjustCode (O8));
ofsort Pair
forall B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8 : Bit,
O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6, O7, O8: Octet,
J, K : Block
BYT (J, K) = AuxBYT (J, K, PAT (J, K));
AuxBYT (Block (O1, O2, O3, O4), Block (O5, O6, O7, O8),
Octet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8)) =
Pair (Block (Adjust (O1, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, B1)),
Adjust (O2, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, B1, B2)),
Adjust (O3, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, B1, B2, B3)),
Adjust (O4, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, B1, B2, B3, B4))),
Block (Adjust (O5, Octet (0, 0, 0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5)),
Adjust (O6, Octet (0, 0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6)),
Adjust (O7, Octet (0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7)),
Adjust (O8, Octet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))));
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type Prelude is Functions
opns
Q : Octet -> Block
SQUARE : Block -> Block
J1_2, J1_4, J1_6, J1_8 : Block -> Block
J2_2, J2_4, J2_6, J2_8 : Block -> Block
K1_2, K1_4, K1_5, K1_7, K1_9 : Block -> Block
K2_2, K2_4, K2_5, K2_7, K2_9 : Block -> Block
H4, H6, H8, H0, H7, H9 : Block -> Block
64 Comparative Study of Eight Formal Specifications of the Message Authenticator Algorithm
H5 : Block, Octet -> Block
Prelude : Block, Block -> ThreePairs
AuxPrelude : Pair, Octet -> ThreePairs
eqns
ofsort Block
forall P: Octet
Q (P) = SQUARE (ADD (Block (x00, x00, x00, P),
Block (x00, x00, x00, x01)));
ofsort Block
forall B: Block
SQUARE (B) = LOW_MUL (B, B);
ofsort Block
forall J: Block
J1_2 (J) = MUL1 (J, J);
J1_4 (J) = MUL1 (J1_2 (J), J1_2 (J));
J1_6 (J) = MUL1 (J1_2 (J), J1_4 (J));
J1_8 (J) = MUL1 (J1_2 (J), J1_6 (J));
J2_2 (J) = MUL2 (J, J);
J2_4 (J) = MUL2 (J2_2 (J), J2_2 (J));
J2_6 (J) = MUL2 (J2_2 (J), J2_4 (J));
J2_8 (J) = MUL2 (J2_2 (J), J2_6 (J));
ofsort Block
forall K: Block
K1_2 (K) = MUL1 (K, K);
K1_4 (K) = MUL1 (K1_2 (K), K1_2 (K));
K1_5 (K) = MUL1 (K, K1_4 (K));
K1_7 (K) = MUL1 (K1_2 (K), K1_5 (K));
K1_9 (K) = MUL1 (K1_2 (K), K1_7 (K));
K2_2 (K) = MUL2 (K, K);
K2_4 (K) = MUL2 (K2_2 (K), K2_2 (K));
K2_5 (K) = MUL2 (K, K2_4 (K));
K2_7 (K) = MUL2 (K2_2 (K), K2_5 (K));
K2_9 (K) = MUL2 (K2_2 (K), K2_7 (K));
ofsort Block
forall J, K: Block, P: Octet
H4 (J) = XOR (J1_4 (J), J2_4 (J));
H6 (J) = XOR (J1_6 (J), J2_6 (J));
H8 (J) = XOR (J1_8 (J), J2_8 (J));
H0 (K) = XOR (K1_5 (K), K2_5 (K));
H5 (K, P) = MUL2 (H0 (K), Q (P));
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H7 (K) = XOR (K1_7 (K), K2_7 (K));
H9 (K) = XOR (K1_9 (K), K2_9 (K));
ofsort ThreePairs
forall J, K: Block, P: Octet
Prelude (J, K) = AuxPrelude (BYT (J, K), PAT (J, K));
ofsort ThreePairs
forall J, K: Block, P: Octet
AuxPrelude (Pair (J, K), P) =
ThreePairs (BYT (H4 (J), H5 (K, P)),
BYT (H6 (J), H7 (K)),
BYT (H8 (J), H9 (K)));
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
type MAA is Prelude, Message
opns
ComputeXY : Pair, Block, Block -> Pair
MainLoop : TwoPairs, Block -> TwoPairs
ComputeZ : TwoPairs -> Block
Coda : TwoPairs, Pair -> Block
255 (∗! implementedby N255 external ∗) : -> Nat
MAC (∗! implementedbyMAC ∗) : Block, Block, Message -> Block
MAAstart : ThreePairs, Message -> Block
MAA : Message, Nat, TwoPairs, Pair, Pair, Pair -> Block
MAAjump : Message, Block, Pair, Pair, Pair -> Block
eqns
ofsort Pair
forall X, Y, M, E: Block
ComputeXY (Pair (X, Y), M, E) =
Pair (MUL1 (XOR (X, M), FIX1 (ADD (XOR (Y, M), E))),
MUL2A (XOR (Y, M), FIX2 (ADD (XOR (X, M), E))));
ofsort TwoPairs
forall XY: Pair, B, V, W: Block
MainLoop (TwoPairs (XY, Pair (V, W)), B) =
TwoPairs (ComputeXY (XY, B, XOR (CYC (V), W)), Pair (CYC (V), W));
ofsort Block
forall X, Y: Block, VW: Pair
ComputeZ (TwoPairs (Pair (X, Y), VW)) = XOR (X, Y);
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ofsort Block
forall XYVW: TwoPairs, S, T: Block
Coda (XYVW, Pair (S, T)) = ComputeZ (MainLoop (MainLoop (XYVW, S), T));
ofsort Block
forall J, K : Block, M: Message
MAC (J, K, M) = MAAstart (Prelude (J, K), M);
ofsort Block
forall X0Y0, V0W, ST : Pair, M: Message
MAAstart (ThreePairs (X0Y0, V0W, ST), M) =
MAA (M, 255, TwoPairs (X0Y0, V0W), X0Y0, V0W, ST);
ofsort Block
forall X0Y0, V0W, ST : Pair, XYVW: TwoPairs, B : Block, N: Nat, M: Message
MAA (nil, N, XYVW, X0Y0, V0W, ST) = Coda (XYVW, ST);
MAA (B ++ M, 0, XYVW, X0Y0, V0W, ST) =
MAAjump (M, Coda (MainLoop (XYVW, B), ST), X0Y0, V0W, ST);
MAA (B ++ M, succ (N), XYVW, X0Y0, V0W, ST) =
MAA (M, N, MainLoop (XYVW, B), X0Y0, V0W, ST);
ofsort Block
forall X0Y0, V0W, ST : Pair, B, Z : Block, M: Message
MAAjump (nil, Z, X0Y0, V0W, ST) = Z;
MAAjump (B ++ M, Z, X0Y0, V0W, ST) =
MAA (B ++ M, 255, MainLoop (TwoPairs (X0Y0, V0W), Z), X0Y0, V0W, ST);
endtype
(∗ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−∗)
behaviour
stop
endspec
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D Formal Specification of the MAA in LNT
This annex presents the specification LNT-17 of the MAA in LNT. This specification uses several
predefined libraries of LNT, namely: the libraries for Booleans and natural numbers, which we do not
reproduce here, and the libraries for bits, octets, and octet values, of which we only display excerpts
needed for understanding the MAA specification. It also defines two new libraries for blocks and block
values, which we display hereafter.
D.1 The BIT library
This predefined LNT library defines the Bit type with its related operations. Only an excerpt of this
library is presented here.
module BIT is
type BIT is
0, 1
with "eq", "ne", "lt", "le", "ge", "gt"
end type
function not (B : Bit) : Bit is
case B in
0 -> return 1
| 1 -> return 0
end case
end function
function _and_ (B1, B2 : Bit) : Bit is
case B1 in
0 -> return 0
| 1 -> return B2
end case
end function
function _or_ (B1, B2 : Bit) : Bit is
case B1 in
0 -> return B2
| 1 -> return 1
end case
end function
function _xor_ (B1, B2 : Bit) : Bit is
case B1 in
0 -> return B2
| 1 -> return not (B2)
end case
end function
end module
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D.2 The OCTET library
This predefined LNT library defines the Octet type (i.e., an 8-bit word) with its related operations. Only
an excerpt of this library is presented here.
module OCTET (BIT) is
type Octet is
Octet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8 : Bit)
with "eq", "ne", "get"
end type
function not (O : Octet) : Octet is
return Octet (not (O.B1), not (O.B2),
not (O.B3), not (O.B4),
not (O.B5), not (O.B6),
not (O.B7), not (O.B8))
end function
function _and_ (O1, O2 : Octet) : Octet is
return Octet (O1.B1 and O2.B1, O1.B2 and O2.B2,
O1.B3 and O2.B3, O1.B4 and O2.B4,
O1.B5 and O2.B5, O1.B6 and O2.B6,
O1.B7 and O2.B7, O1.B8 and O2.B8)
end function
function _or_ (O1, O2 : Octet) : Octet is
return Octet (O1.B1 or O2.B1, O1.B2 or O2.B2,
O1.B3 or O2.B3, O1.B4 or O2.B4,
O1.B5 or O2.B5, O1.B6 or O2.B6,
O1.B7 or O2.B7, O1.B8 or O2.B8)
end function
function _xor_ (O1, O2 : Octet) : Octet is
return Octet (O1.B1 xor O2.B1, O1.B2 xor O2.B2,
O1.B3 xor O2.B3, O1.B4 xor O2.B4,
O1.B5 xor O2.B5, O1.B6 xor O2.B6,
O1.B7 xor O2.B7, O1.B8 xor O2.B8)
end function
end module
D.3 The OCTETVALUES library
This predefined LNT library defines 256 constant functions x00, ..., xFF that provide shorthand notations
for octet values. Only an excerpt of this library is presented here.
module OCTETVALUES (BIT, OCTET) is
function x00 : Octet is
return Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
end function
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function x01 : Octet is
return Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
end function
...
function xFE : Octet is
return Octet (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
end function
function xFF : Octet is
return Octet (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
end function
end module
D.4 The BLOCK library
This library defines the Block type (i.e., a 32-bit word) with its logical and arithmetical operations, the
latter being implemented externally as a set of functions written in the C language.
module BLOCK (BIT, OCTET) is
type Block is
Block (O1, O2, O3, O4 : Octet)
with "get", "=="
end type
function _==_ (O1, O2 : Octet) : Bool is
return eq (O1, O2)
end function
function _AND_ (X, Y : Block) : Block is
return Block (X.O1 and Y.O1, X.O2 and Y.O2, X.O3 and Y.O3, X.O4 and Y.O4)
end function
function _OR_ (X, Y : Block) : Block is
return Block (X.O1 or Y.O1, X.O2 or Y.O2, X.O3 or Y.O3, X.O4 or Y.O4)
end function
function _XOR_ (X, Y : Block) : Block is
return Block (X.O1 xor Y.O1, X.O2 xor Y.O2, X.O3 xor Y.O3, X.O4 xor Y.O4)
end function
function CYC (X : Block) : Block is
return Block (
Octet (X.O1.B2, X.O1.B3, X.O1.B4, X.O1.B5, X.O1.B6, X.O1.B7, X.O1.B8, X.O2.B1),
Octet (X.O2.B2, X.O2.B3, X.O2.B4, X.O2.B5, X.O2.B6, X.O2.B7, X.O2.B8, X.O3.B1),
Octet (X.O3.B2, X.O3.B3, X.O3.B4, X.O3.B5, X.O3.B6, X.O3.B7, X.O3.B8, X.O4.B1),
Octet (X.O4.B2, X.O4.B3, X.O4.B4, X.O4.B5, X.O4.B6, X.O4.B7, X.O4.B8, X.O1.B1))
end function
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function ADD (X, Y : Block) : Block is
!implementedby "ADD" !external
null −− sum modulo 2ˆ32 of X and Y
end function
function CAR (X, Y : Block) : Block is
!implementedby "CAR" !external
null −− carry of the sum of X and Y; result is either x00000000 or x00000001
end function
function HIGH_MUL (X, Y : Block) : Block is
!implementedby "HIGH_MUL" !external
null −− 32 most significant bits of the 64−bit product of X and Y
end function
function LOW_MUL (X, Y : Block) : Block is
!implementedby "LOW_MUL" !external
null −− 32 least significant bits of the 64−bit product of X and Y
end function
end module
D.5 The BLOCKVALUES library
This library defines constant functions x00000000, ..., xFFFFFFFF that provide shorthand notations for
block values. Only the useful constants (207 among 232) are defined. An excerpt of this library is
presented here.
module BLOCKVALUES (OCTETVALUES, BLOCK) is
function x00000000 : Block is
return Block (x00, x00, x00, x00)
end function
function x00000001 : Block is
return Block (x00, x00, x00, x01)
end function
...
function xFFFFFFFE : Block is
return Block (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFE)
end function
function xFFFFFFFF : Block is
return Block (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFF)
end function
end module
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D.6 The MAA specification
module MAA (BIT, OCTET, OCTETVALUES, BLOCK, BLOCKVALUES) is
!nat bits 32
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
type Message is
list of Block
with "==", "!=", "head", "tail", "append", "reverse"
end type
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MakeMessage (N : Nat, in var INIT : Block, INCR : Block) : Message is
assert N > 0;
var I : Nat, RESULT : Message in
RESULT := {};
for I := 1 while I <= N by I := I + 1 loop
RESULT := append (INIT, RESULT);
INIT := ADD (INIT, INCR)
end loop;
return RESULT
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function FIX1 (X : Block) : Block is
return (X OR x02040801) AND xBFEF7FDF −− A = x02040801, C = xBFEF7FDF
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function FIX2 (X : Block) : Block is
return (X OR x00804021) AND x7DFEFBFF −− B = x00804021, D = x7DFEFBFF
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL1 (X, Y : Block) : Block is
var U, L, S, C : Block in
U := HIGH_MUL (X, Y);
L := LOW_MUL (X, Y);
S := ADD (U, L);
C := CAR (U, L);
assert (C == x00000000) or (C == x00000001);
return ADD (S, C)
end var
end function
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL2 (X, Y : Block) : Block is
var U, L, D, F, S, E, C : Block in
U := HIGH_MUL (X, Y);
L := LOW_MUL (X, Y);
D := ADD (U, U);
E := CAR (U, U);
assert (E == x00000000) or (E == x00000001);
F := ADD (D, ADD (E, E));
S := ADD (F, L);
C := CAR (F, L);
assert (C == x00000000) or (C == x00000001);
return ADD (S, ADD (C, C))
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MUL2A (X, Y : Block) : Block is
var U, L, D, S, C : Block in
U := HIGH_MUL (X, Y);
L := LOW_MUL (X, Y);
D := ADD (U, U);
S := ADD (D, L);
C := CAR (D, L);
assert (C == x00000000) or (C == x00000001);
return ADD (S, ADD (C, C))
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function NeedAdjust (O : Octet) : Bool is
return (O == x00) or (O == xFF)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function AdjustCode (O : Octet) : Bit is
if NeedAdjust (O) then
return 1
else
return 0
end if
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function Adjust (O, P : Octet) : Octet is
if NeedAdjust (O) then
return O xor P
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else
return O
end if
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PAT (X, Y : Block) : Octet is
return Octet (AdjustCode (X.O1), AdjustCode (X.O2),
AdjustCode (X.O3), AdjustCode (X.O4),
AdjustCode (Y.O1), AdjustCode (Y.O2),
AdjustCode (Y.O3), AdjustCode (Y.O4))
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function BYT (X, Y : Block, out U, L : Block) is
var P : Octet in
P := PAT (X, Y);
U := Block (
Adjust (X.O1, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, P.B1)),
Adjust (X.O2, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, P.B1, P.B2)),
Adjust (X.O3, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, P.B1, P.B2, P.B3)),
Adjust (X.O4, Octet (0, 0, 0, 0, P.B1, P.B2, P.B3, P.B4)));
L := Block (
Adjust (Y.O1, Octet (0, 0, 0, P.B1, P.B2, P.B3, P.B4, P.B5)),
Adjust (Y.O2, Octet (0, 0, P.B1, P.B2, P.B3, P.B4, P.B5, P.B6)),
Adjust (Y.O3, Octet (0, P.B1, P.B2, P.B3, P.B4, P.B5, P.B6, P.B7)),
Adjust (Y.O4, Octet (P.B1, P.B2, P.B3, P.B4, P.B5, P.B6, P.B7, P.B8)))
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PreludeJ (J1 : Block,
out var J12, J14, J16 : Block, out J18 : Block,
out var J22, J24, J26 : Block, out J28 : Block) is
J12 := MUL1 (J1, J1);
J14 := MUL1 (J12, J12);
J16 := MUL1 (J12, J14);
J18 := MUL1 (J12, J16);
J22 := MUL2 (J1, J1);
J24 := MUL2 (J22, J22);
J26 := MUL2 (J22, J24);
J28 := MUL2 (J22, J26)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PreludeK (K1 : Block,
out var K12, K14, K15, K17 : Block, out K19 : Block,
out var K22, K24, K25, K27 : Block, out K29 : Block) is
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K12 := MUL1 (K1, K1);
K14 := MUL1 (K12, K12);
K15 := MUL1 (K1, K14);
K17 := MUL1 (K12, K15);
K19 := MUL1 (K12, K17);
K22 := MUL2 (K1, K1);
K24 := MUL2 (K22, K22);
K25 := MUL2 (K1, K24);
K27 := MUL2 (K22, K25);
K29 := MUL2 (K22, K27)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function Q (O : Octet) : Block is
var B : Block in
B := ADD (Block (x00, x00, x00, O), x00000001);
return LOW_MUL (B, B)
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PreludeHJ (J14, J16, J18, J24, J26, J28 : Block,
out H4, H6, H8 : Block) is
H4 := XOR (J14, J24);
H6 := XOR (J16, J26);
H8 := XOR (J18, J28)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function PreludeHK (K15, K17, K19, K25, K27, K29 : Block, P : Octet,
out var H0 : Block, out H5, H7, H9 : Block) is
H0 := XOR (K15, K25);
H5 := MUL2 (H0, Q (P));
H7 := XOR (K17, K27);
H9 := XOR (K19, K29)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function Prelude (in J, K : Block, out X, Y, V, W, S, T : Block) is
var P : Octet,
J1, J12, J14, J16, J18, J22, J24, J26, J28 : Block,
K1, K12, K14, K15, K17, K22, K24, K25, K27, K19, K29 : Block,
H4, H0, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9 : Block in
BYT (J, K, ?J1, ?K1);
P := PAT (J, K);
PreludeJ (J1, ?J12, ?J14, ?J16, ?J18, ?J22, ?J24, ?J26, ?J28);
use J12;
use J22;
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PreludeK (K1, ?K12, ?K14, ?K15, ?K17, ?K19, ?K22, ?K24, ?K25, ?K27, ?K29);
use K12;
use K22;
use K14;
use K24;
PreludeHJ (J14, J16, J18, J24, J26, J28, ?H4, ?H6, ?H8);
PreludeHK (K15, K17, K19, K25, K27, K29, P, ?H0, ?H5, ?H7, ?H9);
use H0;
BYT (H4, H5, ?X, ?Y);
BYT (H6, H7, ?V, ?W);
BYT (H8, H9, ?S, ?T)
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MainLoop (in out X, Y, V : Block, W, B : Block) is
V := CYC (V);
var E, X1, Y1 : Block in
E := XOR (V, W);
X1 := MUL1 (XOR (X, B), FIX1 (ADD (XOR (Y, B), E)));
Y1 := MUL2A (XOR (Y, B), FIX2 (ADD (XOR (X, B), E)));
X := X1;
Y := Y1
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function Coda (in var X, Y, V : Block, W, S, T : Block, out Z : Block) is
−− Coda (two more iterations with S and T)
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
use V;
Z := XOR (X, Y)
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function MAC (J, K : Block, in var M : Message) : Block is
!implementedby "MAC"
−− this function is invoked externally from handwritten C code
assert M != {};
var X, X0, Y, Y0, V, V0, W, S, T, Z : Block, N : Nat in
Prelude (J, K, ?X0, ?Y0, ?V0, ?W, ?S, ?T);
X := X0;
Y := Y0;
V := V0;
N := 0;
loop
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, head (M));
M := tail (M);
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N := N + 1;
if M == {} then
Coda (X, Y, V, W, S, T, ?Z);
return Z
elsif N == 256 then
Coda (X, Y, V, W, S, T, ?Z);
X := X0;
Y := Y0;
V := V0;
N := 0;
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, Z)
end if
end loop
end var
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function CHECK : int is
!implementedby "CHECK"
−− this function is invoked externally from handwritten C code
−− it checks the official test vectors given in [ISO 8730:1990] on the one
−− hand, and [ISO 8731−2:1992] and [Davies−Clayden−88] on the other hand
−− test vectors for function MUL1 − cf. Table 1 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert MUL1 (x0000000F, x0000000E) == x000000D2;
assert MUL1 (xFFFFFFF0, x0000000E) == xFFFFFF2D;
assert MUL1 (xFFFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1) == x000000D2;
−− test vectors for function MUL2 − cf. Table 1 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert MUL2 (x0000000F, x0000000E) == x000000D2;
assert MUL2 (xFFFFFFF0, x0000000E) == xFFFFFF3A;
assert MUL2 (xFFFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1) == x000000B6;
−− test vectors for function MUL2A − cf. Table 1 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert MUL2A (x0000000F, x0000000E) == x000000D2;
assert MUL2A (xFFFFFFF0, x0000000E) == xFFFFFF3A;
assert MUL2A (x7FFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1) == x800000C2;
assert MUL2A (xFFFFFFF0, x7FFFFFF1) == x000000C4;
−− test vectors for function BYT − cf. Table 2 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
var U, L : Block in
BYT (x00000000, x00000000, ?U, ?L);
assert U == x0103070F;
assert L == x1F3F7FFF;
BYT (xFFFF00FF, xFFFFFFFF, ?U, ?L);
assert U == xFEFC07F0;
assert L == xE0C08000;
BYT (xAB00FFCD, xFFEF0001, ?U, ?L);
assert U == xAB01FCCD;
assert L == xF2EF3501
end var;
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−− test vectors for function PAT − cf. Table 2 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert PAT (x00000000, x00000000) == xFF;
assert PAT (xFFFF00FF, xFFFFFFFF) == xFF;
assert PAT (xAB00FFCD, xFFEF0001) == x6A;
var J1, J12, J14, J16, J18, J22, J24, J26, J28 : Block,
K1, K12, K14, K15, K17, K19, K22, K24, K25, K27, K29 : Block,
H0, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9 : Block, P : Octet in
J1 := x00000100;
K1 := x00000080;
P := x01;
PreludeJ (J1, ?J12, ?J14, ?J16, ?J18, ?J22, ?J24, ?J26, ?J28);
PreludeK (K1, ?K12, ?K14, ?K15, ?K17, ?K19, ?K22, ?K24, ?K25, ?K27, ?K29);
PreludeHJ (J14, J16, J18, J24, J26, J28, ?H4, ?H6, ?H8);
PreludeHK (K15, K17, K19, K25, K27, K29, P, ?H0, ?H5, ?H7, ?H9);
−− test vectors for J1i values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert J12 == x00010000;
assert J14 == x00000001;
assert J16 == x00010000;
assert J18 == x00000001;
−− test vectors for J2i values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert J22 == x00010000;
assert J24 == x00000002;
assert J26 == x00020000;
assert J28 == x00000004;
−− test vectors for Hi values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert H4 == x00000003;
assert H6 == x00030000;
assert H8 == x00000005;
−− test vectors for K1i values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert K12 == x00004000;
assert K14 == x10000000;
assert K15 == x00000008;
assert K17 == x00020000;
assert K19 == x80000000;
−− test vectors for K2i values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert K22 == x00004000;
assert K24 == x10000000;
assert K25 == x00000010;
assert K27 == x00040000;
assert K29 == x00000002;
−− test vectors for Hi values − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert H0 == x00000018;
assert Q (P) == x00000004;
assert H5 == x00000060;
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assert H7 == x00060000;
assert H9 == x80000002;
−− test vectors for function PAT − cf. Table 3 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
assert PAT (H4, H5) == xEE;
assert PAT (H6, H7) == xBB;
assert PAT (H8, H9) == xE6;
−− test vectors for function BYT − logically inferred from Table 3
var U, L : Block in
BYT (H4, H5, ?U, ?L);
assert U == x01030703;
assert L == x1D3B7760;
BYT (H6, H7, ?U, ?L);
assert U == x0103050B;
assert L == x17065DBB;
BYT (H8, H9, ?U, ?L);
assert U == x01030705;
assert L == x80397302
end var
end var;
−− test vectors for function Main Loop − cf. Table 4 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
var A, B, C, D, E, F, G, M, V, W, X0, X, Y0, Y, Z : Block in
−− first single−block message
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000004; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000001; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFF7; −− fake ”C” constant
D := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000003;
W := x00000003;
X0 := x00000002;
Y0 := x00000003;
M := x00000005;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x00000006;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000005;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == x00000007;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == x00000006;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == x0000000B;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == x0000000C;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == x0000000F;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == x0000000D;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == x00000007;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x00000009;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x00000031;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x00000036;
Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x00000007
end var;
var A, B, C, D, E, F, G, M, V, W, X0, X, Y0, Y, Z : Block in
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−− second single−block message
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000001; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000004; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFF9; −− fake ”C” constant
D := xFFFFFFFC; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000003;
W := x00000003;
X0 := xFFFFFFFD;
Y0 := xFFFFFFFC;
M := x00000001;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x00000006;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000005;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == xFFFFFFFC;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == xFFFFFFFD;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == x00000002;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == x00000001;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == x00000003;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == x00000005;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == x00000001;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x00000004;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == xFFFFFFFC;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == xFFFFFFFA;
Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x00000006
end var;
var A, B, C, D, E, F, G, M, V, W, X0, X, Y0, Y, Z : Block in
−− third single−block message
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000001; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000002; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFFE; −− fake ”C” constant
D := x7FFFFFFD; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000007;
W := x00000007;
X0 := xFFFFFFFD;
Y0 := xFFFFFFFC;
M := x00000008;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x0000000E;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000009;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == xFFFFFFF5;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == xFFFFFFF4;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == xFFFFFFFD;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == xFFFFFFFE;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == xFFFFFFFD;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == xFFFFFFFE;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == xFFFFFFFC;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x7FFFFFFC;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x0000001E;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x0000001E;
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Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x00000000
end var;
var A, B, C, D, E, F, G, M, V, W, X0, X, Y0, Y, Z : Block in
−− three−block message: first block
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000002; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000001; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”C” constant
D := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000001;
W := x00000001;
X0 := x00000001;
Y0 := x00000002;
M := x00000000;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x00000002;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000003;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == x00000001;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == x00000002;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == x00000005;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == x00000004;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == x00000007;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == x00000005;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == x00000003;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x00000001;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x00000003;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x00000002;
Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x00000001;
−− three−block message: second block
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000002; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000001; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”C” constant
D := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000002;
W := x00000001;
X0 := x00000003;
Y0 := x00000002;
M := x00000001;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x00000004;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000005;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == x00000002;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == x00000003;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == x00000008;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == x00000007;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == x0000000A;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == x00000007;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == x0000000A;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x00000003;
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X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x00000014;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x00000009;
Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x0000001D;
−− three−block message: third block
−− input values given in Table 4
A := x00000002; −− fake ”A” constant
B := x00000001; −− fake ”B” constant
C := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”C” constant
D := xFFFFFFFB; −− fake ”D” constant
V := x00000004;
W := x00000001;
X0 := x00000014;
Y0 := x00000009;
M := x00000002;
−− loop iteration described page 10 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
V := CYC (V); assert V == x00000008;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x00000009;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == x00000016;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == x0000000B;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == x00000014;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == x0000001F;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == x00000016;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == x0000001F;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == x00000012;
G := AND (G, D); assert G == x0000001B;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x0000018C;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x00000129;
Z := XOR (X, Y); assert Z == x000000A5
end var;
−− test vectors of Annex E.3.3 of [ISO 8730:1990]
var A, B, C, D, E, F, G, M, V0, V, W, X0, X, Y0, Y : Block in
A := x02040801; −− true ”A” constant
B := x00804021; −− true ”B” constant
C := xBFEF7FDF; −− true ”C” constant
D := x7DFEFBFF; −− true ”D” constant
X0 := x21D869BA;
Y0 := x7792F9D4;
V0 := xC4EB1AEB;
W := xF6A09667;
M := x0A202020;
−− loop iteration on the first block M
V := CYC (V0); assert V == x89D635D7;
E := XOR (V, W); assert E == x7F76A3B0;
X := XOR (X0, M); assert X == x2BF8499A;
Y := XOR (Y0, M); assert Y == x7DB2D9F4;
F := ADD (E, Y); assert F == xFD297DA4;
G := ADD (E, X); assert G == xAB6EED4A;
F := OR (F, A); assert F == xFF2D7DA5;
G := OR (G, B); assert G == xABEEED6B;
F := AND (F, C); assert F == xBF2D7D85;
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G := AND (G, D); assert G == x29EEE96B;
X := MUL1 (X, F); assert X == x0AD67E20;
Y := MUL2A (Y, G); assert Y == x30261492
end var;
−− test vectors for the whole algorithm− cf. Table 5 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z, M1, M2 : Block in
−− first column of Table 5
J := x00FF00FF;
K := x00000000;
M1 := x55555555;
M2 := xAAAAAAAA;
assert PAT (J, K) == xFF;
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
assert X == x4A645A01;
assert Y == x50DEC930;
assert V == x5CCA3239;
assert W == xFECCAA6E;
assert S == x51EDE9C7;
assert T == x24B66FB5;
−− 1st MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M1);
assert X == x48B204D6;
assert Y == x5834A585;
−− 2nd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M2);
assert X == x4F998E01;
assert Y == xBE9F0917;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with S
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
assert X == x344925FC;
assert Y == xDB9102B0;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with T
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
use V;
assert X == x277B4B25;
assert Y == xD636250D;
Z := XOR (X,Y);
assert Z == xF14D6E28
end var;
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z, M1, M2 : Block in
−− second column of Table 5
J := x00FF00FF;
K := x00000000;
M1 := xAAAAAAAA;
M2 := x55555555;
assert PAT (J, K) == xFF;
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
assert X == x4A645A01;
assert Y == x50DEC930;
assert V == x5CCA3239;
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assert W == xFECCAA6E;
assert S == x51EDE9C7;
assert T == x24B66FB5;
−− 1st MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M1);
assert X == x6AEBACF8;
assert Y == x9DB15CF6;
−− 2nd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M2);
assert X == x270EEDAF;
assert Y == xB8142629;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with S
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
assert X == x29907CD8;
assert Y == xBA92DB12;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with T
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
use V;
assert X == x28EAD8B3;
assert Y == x81D10CA3;
Z := XOR (X,Y);
assert Z == xA93BD410
end var;
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z, M1, M2 : Block in
−− third column of Table 5
J := x55555555;
K := x5A35D667;
M1 := x00000000;
M2 := xFFFFFFFF;
assert PAT (J, K) == x00;
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
assert X == x34ACF886;
assert Y == x7397C9AE;
assert V == x7201F4DC;
assert W == x2829040B;
assert S == x9E2E7B36;
assert T == x13647149;
−− 1st MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M1);
assert X == x2FD76FFB;
assert Y == x550D91CE;
−− 2nd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M2);
assert X == xA70FC148;
assert Y == x1D10D8D3;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with S
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
assert X == xB1CC1CC5;
assert Y == x29C1485F;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with T
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
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use V;
assert X == x288FC786;
assert Y == x9115A558;
Z := XOR (X,Y);
assert Z == xB99A62DE
end var;
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T, Z, M1, M2 : Block in
−− fourth column of Table 5
J := x55555555;
K := x5A35D667;
M1 := xFFFFFFFF;
M2 := x00000000;
assert PAT (J, K) == x00;
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
assert X == x34ACF886;
assert Y == x7397C9AE;
assert V == x7201F4DC;
assert W == x2829040B;
assert S == x9E2E7B36;
assert T == x13647149;
−− 1st MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M1);
assert X == x8DC8BBDE;
assert Y == xFE4E5BDD;
−− 2nd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, M2);
assert X == xCBC865BA;
assert Y == x0297AF6F;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with S
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
assert X == x3CF3A7D2;
assert Y == x160EE9B5;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with T
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
use V;
assert X == xD0482465;
assert Y == x7050EC5E;
Z := XOR (X,Y);
assert Z == xA018C83B
end var;
var J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T : Block in
−− test vectors of Annex E.3.3 of [ISO 8730:1990]
J := xE6A12F07;
K := x9D15C437;
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
assert X == x21D869BA;
assert Y == x7792F9D4;
assert V == xC4EB1AEB;
assert W == xF6A09667;
assert S == x6D67E884;
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assert T == xA511987A
end var;
−− test vectors for the whole algorithm
var B, J, K, X, Y, V, W, S, T : Block, M : Message in
J := x80018001;
K := x80018000;
−− test mentioned in Table 6 of [ISO 8731−2:1992]
−− iterations on a message containg 20 null blocks
Prelude (J, K, ?X, ?Y, ?V, ?W, ?S, ?T);
B := x00000000;
−− 1st MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x303FF4AA;
assert Y == x1277A6D4;
−− 2nd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x55DD063F;
assert Y == x4C49AAE0;
−− 3rd MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x51AF3C1D;
assert Y == x5BC02502;
−− 4th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xA44AAAC0;
assert Y == x63C70DBA;
−− 5th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x4D53901A;
assert Y == x2E80AC30;
−− 6th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x5F38EEF1;
assert Y == x2A6091AE;
−− 7th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xF0239DD5;
assert Y == x3DD81AC6;
−− 8th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xEB35B97F;
assert Y == x9372CDC6;
−− 9th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x4DA124A1;
assert Y == xC6B1317E;
−− 10th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x7F839576;
assert Y == x74B39176;
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−− 11th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x11A9D254;
assert Y == xD78634BC;
−− 12th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xD8804CA5;
assert Y == xFDC1A8BA;
−− 13th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x3F6F7248;
assert Y == x11AC46B8;
−− 14th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xACBC13DD;
assert Y == x33D5A466;
−− 15th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x4CE933E1;
assert Y == xC21A1846;
−− 16th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xC1ED90DD;
assert Y == xCD959B46;
−− 17th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x3CD54DEB;
assert Y == x613F8E2A;
−− 18th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xBBA57835;
assert Y == x07C72EAA;
−− 19th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == xD7843FDC;
assert Y == x6AD6E8A4;
−− 20th MainLoop iteration
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, B);
assert X == x5EBA06C2;
assert Y == x91896CFA;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with S
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, S);
assert X == x1D9C9655;
assert Y == x98D1CC75;
−− Coda: MainLoop iteration with T
MainLoop (!?X, !?Y, !?V, W, T);
use V;
assert X == x7BC180AB;
assert Y == xA0B87B77;
M := MakeMessage (20, x00000000, x00000000);
assert MAC (J, K, M) == xDB79FBDC;
H. Garavel & L. Marsso 87
−− supplementary tests added by H. Garavel and L. Marsso
M := MakeMessage (16, x00000000, x07050301);
assert MAC (J, K, M) == x8CE37709;
M := MakeMessage (256, x00000000, x07050301);
assert MAC (J, K, M) == x717153D5;
M := MakeMessage (4100, x00000000, x07050301);
assert MAC (J, K, M) == x7783C51D
end var;
return 0
end function
end module
